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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-JUROR MISCON-
DUCT-PREMATURE DELIBERATIONS-The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the use of a questionnaire
was inadequate to enable the district court to fulfill its responsibil-
ity of determining whether a jury was prejudiced due to premature
discussions of the case and that the district court should have con-
ducted a further investigation into the nature and extent of the
discussions in order to determine whether the jury was prejudiced.
United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993).
In April of 1991, Louis Faustino Hidalgo and Jesus Cepeda, Jr.
("Appellants") were arrested while attempting to make an illegal
drug sale.' They were indicted by a grand jury and charged with
violations of the Controlled Substance Act' and the Gun Control
Act.' Appellants were tried together in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.4 In its preliminary
instructions, the district court repeatedly admonished the jury not
to discuss the case until the close of the trial when all the evidence
was in and the jury was formally given its instructions.8 Neverthe-
less, on approximately the seventh day of a nine-day trial, one of
the jurors informed the court that several of the jurors had been
discussing the case while on break and while waiting in the jury
room.' Appellants moved for individualized voir dire of the jurors
in order to determine what had occurred and whether the jurors
had been prejudiced by the alleged premature discussions.7 Alter-
natively, Appellants moved for a mistrial.8 The district court de-
nied both motions, and instead gave each juror the following writ-
ten questionnaire:
1. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 687 (3d Cir. 1993).
2. Resko, 3 F.3d at 687. Appellants were charged with entering into a conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and heroin and entering into a conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine in violation of sections 841(a)(1), 841(a)(2), and 846 of the Controlled Sub-
stance Act. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & (2), 846 (1988).
3. Resko, 3 F.3d at 687. Appellants were charged with using a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking offense in violation of section 924(c) of the Gun Control Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1988).




8. Id. at 688.
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1. Have you participated in discussing the facts of this case with one or
more other jurors during the trial?
2. If your answer to question No. 1 is "Yes", have you formed an opinion
about the guilt or non-guilt of either defendant as a result of your discus-
sion with other jurors?9
Only the jury members were present in the courtroom while an-
swering this questionnaire.'0 All the jurors responded "Yes" to the
first question and "No" to the second question.' Subsequently,
Appellants once again motioned the court to give a more detailed
inquiry or to grant a mistrial, but the court denied this motion. 2
The trial resumed and the jury found Appellants guilty on all
charges. 3 Appellants appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals alleging that, in light of their Sixth Amendment' 4 right to a
fair trial before an impartial jury, the district court abused its dis-
cretion by failing to conduct a further inquiry into whether the
jurors were prejudiced and by failing to declare a mistrial. 5
The circuit court premised its discussion by stating that as a
general rule jurors must not discuss a case prior to hearing all the
evidence, hearing the court's instructions, and deliberating as a
single unit.'" The court noted that the purpose of this rule is to
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and to
maintain the defendant's due process right to have the government
bear the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.'7
9. Resko, 3 F.3d at 688.




14. The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15. Resko, 3 F.3d at 688.
16. Id. The court noted that most federal trial judges use the following preliminary
instructions to jurors:
You will not be required to remain together while the court is in recess. It is impor-
tant that you obey the following instructions with reference to the recesses of the
court: First, do not discuss the case either among yourselves or with anyone else dur-
ing the course of the trial. In fairness to the parties to this lawsuit you should keep an
open mind throughout the trial, reaching your conclusion only during your final de-
liberations after all the evidence is in and you have heard the attorneys' summations
and my instructions to you on the law, and then only after an interchange of views
with the other members of the jury.
Id. (citing 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & IN-
STRUCTIONS § 10.14, at 273 (1977)).
17. Id. at 689-90 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). In re Winship held
that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-
Vol. 32:983
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The court explained that if premature discussions occur before the
defense presents its evidence, any initial opinion formed by the
jury would probably be unfavorable to the defendant."8
The court also premised its analysis by stating that the trial
judge has discretion in dealing with allegations of jury misconduct,
including the determination of whether jurors have been
prejudiced as a result of premature discussions of the case. ' 9 The
court explained that the trial court would be in a better position
than the appellate court to judge the effect of premature discus-
sions and to determine the effectiveness of a cautionary
instruction."0
The court deduced that even given the results of the question-
naire, neither the appellate court nor the district court had any
information concerning the nature or extent of the premature dis-
cussions and whether the discussions in fact prejudiced the ju-
rors." This concerned the court for two reasons.2" First, the dis-
trict court did not have enough information to determine whether
the defendants had been prejudiced by the premature delibera-
tions or to form an appropriate cautionary instruction." Second,
this lack of information hampered the appellate court's ability to
review the district court's determination that the defendants were
not prejudiced.24
yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Resko, 3 F.3d at 688-89. The court explained that opinions formed as a result of
premature discussions are unfavorable to the defendant because: 1) the jury has only heard
the evidence presented by the prosecution, 2) once the juror has expressed his or her opin-
ion, that juror may not approach the case with a fully open mind, 3) premature discussions
among jurors impede the goal of jury decision making as a collective deliberative process, 4)
premature jury deliberations are without the court's instructions on the reasonable doubt
standard, and 5) once the jury forms an unfavorable opinion, the defendant would bear the
burden of proof because through his or her evidence the defendant would have to change
the opinions formed by the jury. Id. at 689.
19. Id. at 690.
20. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690 (citing United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d Cir.
1979) and United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir. 1978)). See notes 59-71
and accompanying text for a discussion of Chiantese.
21. Id. at 690-91.
22. Id. at 691.
23. Id.
24. Id. The court also stated that because the questionnaire was administered to the
jury with no court personnel present, the jurors may have collaborated and formed a collec-
tive agreement to answer "no" to the second question, regardless of their personal views.
Resho, 3 F.3d at 691. Therefore, the results were unreliable. Id.
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Accordingly, the court held that the district court erred both in
denying Appellants' request for a more extensive investigation into
whether the jurors were prejudiced as a result of the premature
deliberations and in denying Appellants' motion for a mistrial.2 5
The court vacated the judgment of the district court and re-
manded for a new trial.
26
As the Resko court indicated, it is not clear where the rule that
jurors may not partake in premature discussions of the case
originated.2 Nevertheless, the rule has been firmly established in
practice in both federal and state courts.2 8 A violation of this rule
was first adjudicated in 1881 in Pool v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. 29 In
Pool, the plaintiff brought suit for injuries sustained as a result of
an accident while in the defendant's employ. 30 In the midst of the
trial, one of the jurors expressed his opinion of the case to a non-
member of the jury despite the court's instructions to the con-
trary.31 Nevertheless, the trial continued and the jury found in
25. Id. The court noted that this holding is consistent with the First Circuit's holding
in United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286 (1st Cir. 1979). In Richman, one of the jurors
referred to the others jurors as "bums" in a statement made to the court marshall. Richman,
600 F.2d at 295. The court held that when jury misconduct has been alleged, the district
court should determine whether the misconduct, in fact, occurred, and if so, determine
whether it was prejudicial. Id. at 295. Furthermore, if there were no grounds for a new trial,
the court should specify the reasons it concluded the misconduct did not take place, or if
the misconduct occurred the court should explain why it was not prejudicial. Id.
The court also noted that this holding comports with its holding in United States v. Dow-
ling, 814 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1987). In Dowling, the district court asked the jurors to raise
their hands if they had been exposed to anything that rendered them incapable of giving a
fair trial after it was alleged that the jury received extra-record information about the facts
of the case. Dowling, 814 F.2d at 135. This court held that the trial court's use of in banc
questioning did not provide the district court with information about what extra-record in-
formation the jurors had been exposed to, nor did it permit the court to judge whether the
jurors retained open minds. Id.
26. Resko, 3 F.3d at 696. The court pointed out that ordinarily a defendant must
prove that the jury was prejudiced before a new trial will be ordered. Id. at 694. Since the
jury misconduct occurred mid-trial and the trial court failed to evaluate the nature of the
jury misconduct, or the existence of prejudice, the court was willing to grant a new trial. Id.
The court also explained that it was remanding for a new trial, as opposed to remanding
for further investigation into prejudice, due to the passage of time and the difficulties in-
volved in the district court reassembling the jury and the jurors recalling their states of
mind. Id. at 695.
27. Id. at 688-89.
28. Id.
29. 6 F. 844 (C.C. Iowa 1881).
30. Pool, 6 F. at 845.
31. Id. at 848. A non-member of the jury testified that the juror told him that the
plaintiff's attorney " 'had the court room full of Keokuk people, who, whenever he said any-
thing, applauded, and that Keokuk thought they had got this thing fixed up very nice.' " Id.
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favor of the defendant.2 The plaintiff then moved for a new trial
on the grounds that the jury had been prejudiced as a result of the
misconduct.3 3 The court dealt with the issue of whether the juror's
misbehavior rendered him an unfair and prejudiced juror thereby
denying the plaintiff his right to a fair and impartial jury trial.3 In
consideration of this question, the court recognized that jurors will
tend to adhere to their opinions once they have made them known
to the public, regardless of the evidence subsequently presented.3 5
Therefore, the court stated that once the juror prematurely dis-
cussed the case outside the jury room, he was no longer an impar-
tial and unbiased juror.36 Accordingly, the court set aside the ver-
dict and granted a new trial.
3 7
In 1945, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the ration-
ale of the Pool court in the landmark decision of Winebrenner v.
United States.38 Unlike Pool, which concerned premature jury dis-
cussions with a non-member of the jury, Winebrenner involved
premature discussions exclusively among the jurors.39  In
Winebrenner, the defendant was being tried for a conspiracy to
defraud the United States Air Force in the purchase of aircraft
equipment.4 0 Before the trial, the court failed to instruct the jurors
that they should not discuss the case among themselves until the
case had been finally submitted to them for deliberation.4 Instead,
the court told the jury that it could discuss the case provided it did
not reach any final conclusions.42
The jury found the defendant guilty, and the defendant ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals contending that the
trial court's instructions constituted reversible error.4' The appel-
late court stated that jurors should not discuss the case among
themselves during a trial because they have not heard all of the
32. Id. at 844.
33. Id. at 845.
34. Id. at 849-50. The court noted that the right to a fair and impartial jury is the
same in both civil and criminal cases Id.
35. Pool, 6 F. at 850.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 851.
38. 147 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 863 (1945).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 323. Entering into a conspiracy to defraud the United States Air Force is a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1966).
41. Id. at 327.
42. Id.
43. Winebrenner. 147 F.2d at 323.
1994 987.
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evidence and the court's final instructions." The court explained
that this had the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defendant, who now had the burden of changing
the prematurely formed opinion.45 Additionally, the court ex-
plained that once a juror had expressed his or her opinion to an-
other juror, the juror who made the statement was inclined to pay
special attention to the evidence that confirms that view." The
Winebrenner court concluded that since the instructions given to
the jury by the trial judge allowed it to discuss the case before all
the evidence was presented, the defendant's right to a fair trial had
been violated.4 7 Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the
case submitted to the lower court with directions to grant the de-
fendant a new trial.48
In 1957, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, when faced with a similar jury misconduct issue, explicitly
distinguished extra-jury influence49 from intra-jury50 influence. In
United States v. Bando,51 the defendants were tried for violations
of the Victim and Witness Protection Act52 and the Fugitive Felon
Act.53 During the course of the trial, it was brought to the court's
attention that while on a lunch break, two of the jurors had been
discussing the conduct of the prosecutor and a witness.54 Instead of
questioning the two jurors who had been discussing the case, the
trial judge admonished the entire jury that it should not form any
opinion regarding the case until all the evidence had been submit-
44. Id. at 328.
45. Id. at 329.
46. Id. at 328. The court explained that this allowed the juror to avoid embarrassment
before the other jurors should the juror change his or her tentative opinion. Id.
47. Id. at 329.
48. Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 329. In his dissent, Circuit Judge Woodrough stated that.
because there was no hint or suggestion that any of the jurors actually engaged in premature
discussions, the conviction should not be reversed. Id. at 330 (Woodrough, J., dissenting).
49. Extra-jury influence has been construed to cover publicity received and discussed
in the jury room, evidence considered by the jury that was not admitted in court, and com-
munications between jurors and third persons. Government of Virgin Isl. v. Gereau, 523
F.2d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 1975).
50. Intra-jury influences have been construed to cover discussions among jurors and
intimidation or harassment of one juror by another. Id.
51. 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957).
52. Bando, 244 F.2d at 836. Defendants were charged with entering into a conspiracy
to injure a witness who was to testify before a grand jury in violation of section 1503 of the
Victim and Witness Protection Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1984).
53. Bando, 244 F.2d at 836. Defendants were charged with entering into a conspiracy
to remove a person from the state in order to prevent that person's arrest in violation of
section 1073 of the Fugitive Felon Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1976).
54. Bando, 244 F.2d at 848-49.
Vol. 32:983
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ted.55 The trial resumed and the defendants were convicted. 56
On appeal, the Second Circuit stated that since the incident did
not involve a discussion between a juror and an outsider, the
court's admonition was all the judicial action required. 7 Further,
the court noted that the statements of the jurors were not prejudi-
cial to the defendants since they were critical only of the prosecu-
tor and the witness.
58
In 1978, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals elaborated on the
distinction between intra-jury influences and extra-jury influences
in United States v. Chiantese.59 In this case, the defendant was
charged with violating the Hobbs Act.6 0 It was called to the trial
court's attention mid-trial that members of the jury had been ob-
served conversing with one another.6 Furthermore, it was reported
to the trial court that a juror made critical comments concerning
the defendant's attorney to two alternate jurors.2 In response, the
defendant's attorney motioned for voir dire of the jury to deter-
mine if the statement had in fact been made, and if made, the ef-
fect it had on the jurors who heard it.6 3 The trial court denied the
motion stating that the conversations among the jurors were not
similar to a typical jury prejudice case where outside influences
corrupt the verdict. 4 The trial judge further explained that the
statements related to the attorney's conduct and not to the case
itself.6
5
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that be-
cause there was a presumption of prejudice when a jury was influ-
55. Id. at 849.
56. Id.
57. Bando, 244 F.2d at 849. The Bando court distinguished this case from Remmer v.
United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956). In Remmer, an outsider told a juror, unbeknownst to the
defendant, that he might make a profitable deal with the defendant. Id. at 378 The Su-
preme Court held that any indirect or direct communication with a juror relating to the
matter pending was presumptively prejudicial and, as such, the lower court judge erred in
failing to determine whether the defendant had been prejudiced as a result of the incident.
Id. at 379.
58. Bando, 244 F.2d at 849.
59. 582 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922 (1979).
60. Chiantese, 582 F.2d at 975. Defendant was charged with attempting to interfere
with interstate commerce in violation of section 1951 of the Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(1984).
61. Chiantese, 582 F.2d at 978.
62. Id. In a statement referring to the defendant's attorney, the juror was overheard
saying "Stupid. Stupid. He's a pain in the . Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 978.
65. Id. at 980.
1994
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enced by outside sources, a trial judge's failure to hold a hearing in
these situations constituted an abuse of discretion and was revers-
ible error." However, the court distinguished this case on the basis
that there was no outside influence.6 7 As such, the court concluded
that the principles concerning outside influences were not control-
ling. 8 Rather, the court stated that in situations which involve in-
tra-jury influences such as premature jury discussions, the trial
judge is afforded broad discretion in dealing with the situation. 9
The court reasoned that the trial court was in a much better posi-
tion to judge the mood and the prejudices of the jury than is an
appellate court which has only the record from which to evaluate
these factors. 70 Accordingly, the court held that because the juror's
comments did not pertain to the defendant's case, the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in not conducting a hearing.
71
The broad discretion afforded the trial judge in dealing with pre-
mature deliberations has been reflected in the opinions of the ap-
pellate courts that have dealt with this issue. For example, in
United States v. Klee,72 the defendant was tried for failure to file
federal income tax returns. 73 Before trial, the court instructed the
jury not to discuss the case until it was submitted to the jury by
the court for decision.74 However, the defendant presented to the
court an affidavit of one of the jurors which stated that some of the
jurors had prematurely discussed the case and that nine jurors had
expressed premature opinions concerning the guilt or innocence of
the defendant.75 The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for
a new trial stating that the only issue in dispute was the defend-
ant's state of mind and that the jury demonstrated its open-mind-
edness on the issue by requesting a re-reading of the instructions
of willfulness before it rendered a verdict.7 The defendant was ul-
timately convicted, and appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit alleging that the trial court erred in
66. Chiantese, 582 F.2d at 979.
67. Id.
68. Id. The court stated that there is a presumption of prejudice with extra-jury influ-
ences and therefore a trial judge's failure to conduct a hearing to determine whether the
jury was prejudiced in these situations constituted reversible error. Id.
69. Id. at 980.
70. Id.
71. Chiantese, 582 F.2d at 980.
72. 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 (1974).
73. Klee, 494 F.2d at 394.
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id.




On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that a mistrial would be
granted when the premature discussions prejudiced the defendant
so that the defendant was not given a fair trial.78 The court ex-
plained that when trial judges rule on this question, the appellate
court cannot properly second guess the conclusion of the trial
judge who was in a better position to determine whether the con-
duct of the jury was prejudicial to the defendant.79 Because the
trial judge in Klee concluded that the defendants were not
prejudiced as a result of the premature discussions, the court held
that it was not an error to deny the mistrial.80
A more recent case depicting the broad discretion afforded a
trial judge in dealing with intra-jury influences was decided by the
Third Circuit in United States v. Clapps.81 The defendants in
Clapps were tried for violations of the Postal Reorganization Act. 2
After all of the evidence had been presented in the case, but before
the closing arguments, it was called to the court's attention by one
of the jurors that several of the jurors had been discussing the
case.8 As an alternative to granting the defendants' motion for a
mistrial, the court remedied any potential prejudice by conducting
a voir dire examination. 4 The court removed two jurors based on
this examination. 5 The trial resumed and the defendants were
found guilty.
6
On appeal, the United States Appeals Court for the Third Cir-
cuit was confronted with the issue of whether the trial judge had
abused his discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a mis-
trial.8 7 Once again, the appellate court premised its opinion by
stating that the trial court was in a better position than the appel-
late court to observe the impact of premature jury discussions and
77. Id. at 395.
78. Klee, 494 F.2d at 396 (citing Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.
1951)). Specifically, the court stated that "the test is whether or not the misconduct has
prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial." Id.
79. Klee, 494 F.2d at 396.
80. Id.
81. 732 F.2d 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085 (1984).
82. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1149. Defendants were charged with fraudulent procurement
and marking of absentee ballots for elections in violation of section 1341 of the Postal Reor-
ganization Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984).
83. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1152.
86. Id. at 1150-52.
87. Id. at 1152.
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to judge the effectiveness of a cautionary instruction."' Because the
trial court conducted a voir dire and concluded that the jurors
were not prejudiced, the court held that there was no abuse of dis-
cretion in denying the motion for a new trial.8 9
Although a majority of the cases hold that there has been no
abuse of discretion by the trial judges in situations involving pre-
mature jury deliberations, there have been instances where the
trial court judge has been held to have acted inadequately in re-
sponse to these situations. One such instance was before the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Kerpan.90 In
Kerpan, the defendant was tried for arson"' and theft." In his in-
troductory instructions to the jury, the trial judge allowed the ju-
rors to hold discussions among themselves throughout the course
of the trial.9 However, several times during the trial, the judge in-
structed the jurors that they should not discuss the case among
themselves and that they should not reach any premature conclu-
sions.94 The jury ultimately found the defendant guilty.9
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania premised its dis-
cussion of the case by holding that premature jury deliberations
were expressly prohibited.96 The court further stated that in this
88. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152 (citing United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 679 (3d
Cir. 1979)). In Pantone, the trial judge conducted a corrective voir dire after it was brought
to the court's attention that a juror had expressed to other jurors her opinion regarding the
guilt of the defendant. Pantone, 609 F.2d at 679. Taking into consideration the results of
the voir dire, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the trial
judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial. Id.
89. Clapps, 732 F.2d at 1152.
90. 498 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1985). See also, State v. Gill, 255 S.E.2d 455 (S.C. 1979) (holding
that it was reversible error for the trial judge to advise the jurors that it was proper to begin
deliberations before the close of the case) and People v. Blondia, 245 N.W. 2d 130 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that a jury instruction which allowed the jury to discuss the case
while the trial was ongoing was novel and inappropriate and constituted reversible error).
91. Kerpan, 498 A.2d at 830. The defendant was charged with arson in violation of
section 3301 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3301 (1983).
92. Kerpan, 498 A.2d at 830. The defendant was charged with theft in violation of
section 901 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code. PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,§ 901 (a) (1983).
93. Kerpan, 498 A.2d at 831.
94. Id. at 832.
95. Id. at 830.
96. Id. at 832. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recommended the following stan-
dardized jury instruction addressing the issue of premature jury deliberations:
2.03 AVOIDING PREMATURE OPINIONS
(1) Each of you must keep an open mind throughout the trial. In the oath you just
took you swore to do so. You should avoid forming opinions about the guilt or inno-
cence of the defendant or about any other disputed questions until you begin your
deliberations.
(2) You should not talk with each other about the evidence or any other matter relat-
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case, the jury was left with conflicting and confusing instructions
regarding whether it was allowed to discuss the case, and if so,
what it was allowed to discuss.97 Hence, the supreme court did not
find that the trial court's subsequent instructions were sufficient to
clarify any misconceptions.98 As such, the court held that the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial had been violated and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial.99
Historically, the only cases dealing exclusively with premature
discussions among jurors where the appellate courts have reversed
the judgement of the trial court and remanded the case for a new
trial were those in which the trial judge authorized the discussions.
For example, in both Winebrenner' and Kerpan 1 the trial judge
advised the jurors that they were permitted to discuss the case
throughout the trial. However, neither case asserted that prema-
ture discussions had actually taken place. This suggests that al-
though trial judges are afforded broad discretion in dealing with
issues involving premature jury discussions, specifically authorizing
the jury to discuss the case during the trial is itself an abuse of this
discretion and constitutes reversible error.
Contrary to this, in those cases where the trial judges did not
authorize the discussions, the appellate courts have been reluctant
to reverse the judgement of the trial court. This reluctance stems
from the belief of the appellate courts that the trial court is in a
better position to determine whether the jury has been prejudiced
as a result of the premature discussions.
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals subscribes to this
belief,102 it nevertheless held in Resko that the district court erred
both in denying the defendants' request for a more extensive in-
vestigation into whether the jurors were prejudiced as a result of
the premature deliberations and in denying the defendants' motion
ing to whether the defendant has been proven guilty until I send you to the jury room
to deliberate on your verdict. Only then will you know enough about the evidence and
the law to discuss the case intelligently and fairly.
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions.
Id. at 832 n.7.
97. Kerpan, 498 A.2d at 832.
98. Id. The superior court had held that the introductory instructions were errone-
ous, but found that the subsequent instructions cleared up any misconceptions. Id. Accord-
ingly, the superior court concluded that the error was harmless and affirmed the conviction.
Id.
99. Id.
100. See notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Winebrenner.
101. See notes 90-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kerpan.
102. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690.
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for a mistrial.103 This decision was based on the court's recognition
that even with the results of the questionnaire, the district court
had no information to back up its determination that the jury was
not prejudiced. 104 The district court simply relied on the negative
responses of the jurors when they were asked whether the prema-
ture discussions led them to form an opinion as to the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant. 10 5 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
stated that if the district court would have inquired into the na-
ture and extent of the discussions, the trial judge most likely would
have been able to justify his determination that no prejudicial con-
duct had occurred. 0 6
This holding suggests that appellate courts will not give defer-
ence to the trial judge's determination without factual support that
the jury was not prejudiced as a result of premature discussions.
Instead, according to Resko the trial judge must support his or her
determination with sound reasoning beyond the fact that the jury
stated that it was not prejudiced.
At first blush, this may seem like a more stringent standard than
previously applied by the courts which must be met before a trial
judge's denial of a mistrial in response to premature jury delibera-
tions will be reversed.- However, a further analysis dictates that the
holding in Resko does not impose a more stringent standard than
previously applied, it simply expresses that standard which has
been implied in prior cases.
One case which does impose a less stringent standard than that
imposed by Resko is Bando. The Second Circuit held in Bando
10 7
that because premature discussions involve intra-jury influences,
all the judicial action required in these situations is that the trial
judge instruct the jury that it should keep an open mind until all
of the evidence has been presented.0 8 However, in those cases de-
cided after Bando where the appellate courts have not reversed the
trial judge's denial of a mistrial due to premature deliberations,
the trial judges have been able to support their determinations
that the jury had not been prejudiced.
103. Id. at 691.
104. Id. at 690-91.
105. Id. at 687.
106. Id. at 692.
107. See notes 51-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bando.
108. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals nevertheless pointed out that the prema-
ture discussions in Bando were not prejudicial toward the defendant because they con-
cerned only the prosecutor and a witness. Bando, 244 F.2d at 848.
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Recent Decisions
For example, in Chiantese0 9 the trial judge stated that the jury
was not prejudiced because the premature discussions involved the
attorney's conduct and not the case itself. In Klee,'" the trial
judge concluded that the jury was not prejudiced because the only
issue was the defendant's state of mind and the jury demonstrated
its open-mindedness on the issue by requesting a re-reading of the
instructions on willfulness. Finally, in Clapps"' the trial judge de-
termined that the jury was not prejudiced because the jurors who
had been discussing the case were identified and removed from the
jury.
In these cases decided prior to Resko, the conclusions drawn by
the trial judges that the jurors were not prejudiced were supported
with sound reasoning. In affirming these conclusions, each appel-
late court made reference to this reasoning. As such, the appellate
courts have implied that such reasoning is required.
In Resko, however, the trial judge relied solely on the statements
of the jurors that they were not prejudiced without disclosing any
further reasons." 2 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized
this, and for the first time expressly stated that a trial judge must
specify reasons as to why the premature discussions were not prej-
udicial to the defendant before denying a motion for a mistrial."'
In conclusion, if it is brought to the trial court's attention that
the jurors have been prematurely discussing the case, the trial
judge must first determine whether the discussions actually took
place." 4 If they did, the trial judge must next ascertain whether
the discussions were prejudicial to the defendant." 5 If the trial
judge does not have enough information to make such a determi-
nation, he or she is required to conduct an investigation into the
nature and extent of the discussions." 6 Finally, the trial judge
must specify reasons as to why the discussions were or were not
prejudicial to the defendant before ruling on a mistrial.1' 7 The dis-
109. See notes 59-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Chiantese..
110. See notes 72-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of Klee.
111. See notes 81-89 and accompan ying text for a discussion of Clapps.
112. Resko, 3 F.3d at 687.
113. Id. at 691.
114. Id.
115. Resko, 3 F.3d at 691. 1
116. In Resko, the court suggested ihat an individualized voir dire of the jurors would
be the most effective manner to conductlan investigation. Id. The court also implied that a
questionnaire would suffice if its contents adequately exposed the nature and extent of the




trict court in Resko failed to follow this procedure. 1 8 As a result,
the Third Circuit expressly stated that the trial judge must make a
reasonable determination that the defendant was not prejudiced
by alleged jury misconduct."1 9 This is entirely consistent with those
cases in which the appellate courts have deferred to the determina-
tion of the trial court that the jury misconduct was not prejudicial.
James P. Thomas
118. See notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
119. See notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
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